The "Christian Black Codes of 1724" comprised a series of articles that dictated various aspects of life, particularly for enslaved and free Black individuals, within the colonial context. These codes inherently possessed an unconstitutional nature due to their conflict with established legal principles and concepts of natural rights, and their application implicitly or explicitly extended to various groups, including those who identify as Mu'ur/Indigenous People of Continental America.
Unconstitutional Nature and Character of the Codes
The Christian Black Codes of 1724 were fundamentally at odds with several legal and philosophical principles prevalent at the time and later enshrined in American constitutional thought:
- Conflict with English Common Law and Colonial Charters: American colonists, including those in South Carolina (where these codes might have applied, given historical context), brought with them the common law of England, which was considered their birthright. Colonial charters, such as those granted to Carolina, generally mandated that local laws be "consonant to reason" and "agreeable to the laws and customs of our kingdom of England". Slavery itself was deemed "unconstitutional" in the colonies, as it was in England, because no colonial charter provided for its legal existence. English statutes, according to sources, never legalized the right of property in man within the thirteen North American colonies, and Parliament likely lacked the power to do so. Lord Mansfield famously stated that slavery was "so odious that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law," which was generally absent in the colonies with respect to the legalization of property in persons. The Black Codes, by establishing chattel slavery and restricting liberties based on race, directly contradicted these foundational common law and charter principles. Laws were required to be "legi fidei rationi consona" (conform to general law) and for the "true and due execution of the laws".
- Violation of Natural Rights: The American colonies, in their Declaration of Independence, asserted fundamental principles like the right to life, liberty, and property, which they held were derived from the immutable laws of nature. The Magna Charta, considered a foundational document for the U.S. Constitution, likewise established rights against arbitrary deprivation. The Black Codes, by enslaving individuals, prohibiting certain religious practices, and restricting movement and property rights based on race or religion, directly violated these inherent, natural rights. Slavery was seen as "repugnant to the law of nature and to every just principle".
- Imposition of "Colored Laws" and "Legal Fictions": From the perspective of some groups, including Moorish Americans, conventional U.S. governmental entities and their enactments are characterized as "legal fictions" operating under "Commercial Law," not the "Supreme Law of the Land". Laws, ordinances, and policies enacted by these entities are referred to as "colored or colorable laws," meaning they appear valid but lack true legal authority, stemming from private corporate interests rather than supreme law. This critique, while articulated later, reflects an underlying view that laws like the Black Codes, which are seen as fundamentally unjust and discriminatory, are inherently illegitimate and without proper authority.
- Contradiction with International Human Rights Standards: While the concept of international human rights developed more formally later, modern interpretations of these codes underscore their unconstitutional character. For instance, ILO Convention No. 169 and Inter-American jurisprudence have deemed policies that label peoples as "savages" or seek to "civilise them through an integrationist policy" as infringing on human dignity and ethnic diversity, thus being "contrary to valid constitutional precepts". The Black Codes' foundational principles align with such condemned "tutelary regimens". States are obligated to interpret and comply with international human rights obligations, taking into account the "socio-cultural specificity" of populations and adopting "special measures" to ensure their rights and cultural identity.
Application to Mu'ur/Indigenous People of Continental America
The Christian Black Codes of 1724, and similar colonial slave statutes, applied broadly to "Negroes" and enslaved populations, often without distinguishing between various ethnic or national origins. However, the sources provide specific, albeit complex, insights into how such laws interacted with the status of Mu'ur/Indigenous Peoples:
- The "Turks and Moors in Amity" Exception: A significant Virginia statute of 1753 (also appearing in Georgia in 1770) stated that "all persons... imported into this colony... and were not Christians in their native country, except Turks and Moors in amity with his majesty... shall be accounted slaves." This clause explicitly recognized a distinction for "Turks and Moors in amity with his majesty," suggesting they were generally not to be enslaved. This indicates a historical awareness of Moors as distinct from other "non-Christian" imported populations and implies that the Black Codes, if interpreted strictly, might have had a limited or nuanced application to those recognized as "Moors in amity."
- Rejection of "Negro" and "African-American" Labels: Moorish Americans assert a distinct nationality and inherited sovereignty as descendants of the Ancient Moabites or Al Moroccan Moors, claiming precedence to European colonization. They explicitly reject labels like "Negro," "Black," or "African-American," viewing them as "misnomers" and "erroneous references" imposed by European psychology and used to misclassify and usurp the identity of indigenous people. By classifying individuals under such broad categories, the Black Codes effectively applied to those who identify as Moorish Americans, despite their assertion of a distinct national and indigenous heritage, thereby forcing them into a "system of chattel backing slavery and animal husbandry".
- Moorish Claims of Paramount Authority and Non-Jurisdiction: Moorish Americans assert that their Moorish Zodiac Constitution is the "only universal unchanged moral law for the human family" and that U.S. lawmakers have "no jurisdiction over the free MOORS – the Beys and Els – in the inherited land of the MOORISH nation". They contend that if U.S. lawmakers ignore their Zodiac Law and birth rights, it constitutes a "supreme violation of their own Magna Charta Code". They view the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1786/1836 (Treaty of Marrakesh) as the "Supreme Law of the Land," which "operated as a repeal of all state laws previously enacted, inconsistent with its provisions". This framework posits that laws like the Black Codes would be "repugnant, null, void and notwithstanding" to the supreme law of the land if they conflict with the treaty.
- Indigenous Status and Rights: Moorish Americans identify as being of "organic and ancient Continental American lineal descent, commonly known as indigenous or [ab]original, or Indian". International law increasingly recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples, affirming their distinct political, legal, economic, social, and cultural institutions, and the right to autonomy or self-government. Such modern principles retrospectively highlight the unconstitutional nature of codes that denied these inherent rights to indigenous groups, including Moorish Americans.
The Christian Black Codes of 1724 represent a historical example of legislation that was inherently unconstitutional due to its conflict with principles of natural law, English common law, and colonial charters, as well as modern international human rights standards. While broadly applied to enslaved populations, the historical record shows a specific, albeit limited, carve-out for "Turks and Moors in amity," which contrasts with the general subjugation enforced by these codes. Moorish Americans assert a distinct national and indigenous status that, by their understanding of supreme law and inherited rights, places them outside the legitimate jurisdiction of such "colored laws."
